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Abstract: This paper explores the relation between belief-like imaginings and the establishment 
of imaginary worlds (often called ‘fictional worlds’). After outlining various assumptions my 
argument is premised on, I argue that belief-like imaginings, in themselves, do not render their 
content true in the imaginary world to which they pertain. I show that this claim applies not only 
to imaginative projects in which we are instructed or intend to imagine certain propositions, but 
also to spontaneous imaginative projects. After arguing that, like guided imaginative projects, 
spontaneous projects involve specific imaginary truths, I conclude that imaginative projects, 
whether spontaneous or deliberate, comprise not only imaginings, but also mental acts of 
determining such ‘truths.’ 
Keywords: belief-like imagining, imaginary worlds, imaginary truths, fiction, spontaneous 
imaginings 
 
Introduction 
 
It is commonly accepted that an imaginative project—the overall mental activity we engage in 
when we imagine—encompasses, in addition to belief-like imaginings, other kinds of mental 
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states, such as emotional reactions, conative states, mental imagery, motivations, etc. (See, e.g., 
Currie and Ravenscroft 2002; Doggett and Egan 2012; Gendler 2003; Ichino 2019; Kind 2013, 
2016; Langland-Hassan 2012; Liao and Doggett 2014; Liao and Gendler 2019; Nichols 2004; 
Nichols and Stich 2003; Schellenberg 2013; Walton 1990, 2015). For instance, one may find 
oneself imagining that one is participating in an anti-corruption demonstration, that the 
demonstration is taking place at a downtown plaza, and related propositions. In addition to these 
belief-like imaginings, the imaginative project might involve mental images of signs and chants, 
desire-like states, such as the ‘wish’ that the demonstration proves efficacious, etc. Similarly, 
someone pretending that the next-door neighbor is an evil dragon not only imagines, when she 
sees the neighbor approaching, that a dragon is approaching, but may also have a fear-like 
emotion, be motivated to escape, ‘wish’ that the dragon would disappear, etc. Such mental 
responses routinely ensue not only in the course of spontaneously imagining, but also in 
engaging with works of fiction, games of make-believe, and other contexts in which belief-like 
imaginings arise. Despite ongoing debate over the nature of these states, it is widely accepted 
that they are integral to imaginative projects. Indeed, it is partly due to these states that belief-
like imaginings are deemed ‘belief-like’: belief-like imaginings are akin to beliefs in that they are 
functionally related to these states just as beliefs are related to these states (or to similar ones). 
Yet another element of an imaginative project is what we often refer to as its ‘imaginary’ or 
‘fictional’ world (and likewise, its ‘imaginary’ or ‘fictional’ truths). Asked about the ‘world’ of 
her project, the first of the aforementioned imaginers would probably respond that an anti-
corruption demonstration took place in that world; asked the same question, the second would 
describe the said world as one in which an evil dragon lived next door, etc. In general, whether 
we intend to imagine or simply find ourselves imagining, and whether the context of our 
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imagining is playing a game of make-believe, daydreaming, reading a novel, or something else, 
we can speak of the ‘world’ of our imaginative project, and about ‘facts’ or ‘truths’ of that world. 
In what follows, I will examine the relation between imaginings and the determination of 
these ‘worlds’ and their ‘facts.’ First, I will argue that imagining a proposition (in the belief-like 
sense) does not render the proposition true in the pertinent imaginary world (section 1). Second, I 
will show that this claim applies, specifically, to spontaneous imaginative projects (subsection 
2.1). Thirdly, I will propose two explanations of the establishment of imaginary worlds in 
spontaneous projects, and argue that one of them is more plausible than the other (subsections 
2.2 and 2.3). I will conclude that in addition to belief-like imaginings and the various sorts of 
mental states that typically accompany belief-like imaginings, imaginative projects—particularly 
spontaneous projects—encompass mental acts of determining imaginary truths. 
Two preliminary comments are in order. First, my argument is not committed to any specific 
metaphysics of imaginary / fictional worlds or entities; for convenience, I take such worlds to be 
sets of propositions. More specifically, I adopt Kendall Walton’s characterization of fictional 
worlds, which identifies them with “sets of propositions-as-indicated-by-a-given-work (or game 
of make-believe or… daydream)” (Walton 1990: 67). On this characterization, two imaginary / 
fictional worlds may comprise the same set of propositions, yet differ because they are set forth 
in different imaginative projects, namely, projects involving different, and differently-related, 
sorts of mental states (i.e., imaginings, emotional responses, conative states, etc.). 
Second, although the terms ‘fictional world’ and ‘fictional truths’ are often used to refer to 
the world and truths associated with imagining in general, I will henceforth use these terms 
solely to refer to the world and truths that are assumed by a work of fiction. That is, I will use the 
terms ‘fictional world’ and ‘fictional truths’ to refer only to the propositions that a given work of 
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fiction assumes to be true, whereas the world and truths associated with an imaginer’s mental 
activity—her imaginative project—will be referred to as the project’s ‘imaginary world’ and 
‘imaginary truths’ (or ‘i-world,’ ‘i-truths,’ and, likewise, ‘i-falsehoods’). 
The rationale for this distinction is that there is a difference between the world or truths that 
are assumed by a work of fiction, and the world or truths that are set down by the imaginer as 
part of her imaginative mental activity, activity that can arise either in response to a work of 
fiction, or otherwise (e.g., in daydreaming, impromptu imagining, etc.). Even if it is usually the 
case that when we engage with a work of fiction and recognize which propositions it takes to be 
true, we respond by taking those fictional truths to be the i-truths of our imaginative project, the 
two sets of propositions—the fictional truths and the project’s i-truths—are defined, and 
recognized, differently. In particular, to find out which propositions a work of fiction assumes to 
be true, we need to interpret the work (just as we need to interpret works of history, biographies, 
or newspaper articles to find out which propositions they assume to be true). By contrast, to 
uncover i-truths, we need to scrutinize the imaginer’s mental activity. Whatever the techniques 
used to interpret a work of fiction and find out what is ‘true in the work,’ discovering what has 
been set down as true in the course of one’s imaginative activity requires reflection on that 
activity. 
 
1. Imaginings and Imaginary Truths 
 
Suppose you’re imagining a proposition, e.g., that a certain building is about to explode, that the 
price of corn is dropping, or that Hillary Clinton is the current US President. Reflecting on your 
imaginative project, you can recount—generally, correctly—what you imagined. Suppose, 
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however, that you are asked whether the proposition you imagined was true in the world of your 
imaginative project. This question, without further qualification, may strike you as odd, probably 
because you take the answer to be trivial: it is obvious, you assume, that the proposition you 
imagined was i-true. After all, you imagined it to be true. Imagining that p, you assume, renders 
p true in the imaginative project’s i-world. 
In this section, I will show that this view is mistaken: imagining a proposition does not 
render it i-true. I do not deny that to imagine a proposition is to imagine it to be true (i.e., true in 
the pertinent i-world). My claim is that it does not follow from this that the imagined proposition 
is true in the pertinent i-world. Compare: to believe a proposition is to believe it to be true (i.e., 
true simpliciter, in the real world), but believing a proposition does not render the believed 
proposition true.1 That is, imaginings, like beliefs, lack the power to render their content ‘true’ in 
 
1 There is another sense in which the content of imaginings is ipso facto true-in-a-world—a sense 
in which the content of beliefs too is ipso facto true-in-a-world. In analyzing the semantics of 
belief, we say that if one believes that Hillary Clinton is the current US president, then in the 
‘belief-world’ of that belief, Clinton is the current president. More precisely, the belief’s content 
is specified by the set of possible worlds in which the believed proposition is true. Similarly, an 
imagined content can be specified by the set of possible worlds in which the imagined 
proposition is true. My claim, however, does not pertain to the semantics of content, but rather to 
the sense in which imagining can be correct or incorrect. Whatever the sense in which 
correctness applies to imaginings, this sort of correctness is evaluated in terms of the world at 
which imaginings are ‘directed’ (as per the characterization presented in the Introduction). See 
also Chasid (forthcoming) and Chasid (2020). 
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the relevant sense. Of course, comparing imaginings and beliefs in this respect is only a 
clarification of the thesis I seek to defend, not an argument for it. To defend the thesis, I will 
adduce cases where imaginings do not have i-true content. I will argue that, since we can 
imagine propositions that are not true in the pertinent i-world, imagining does not, in general, 
render its content i-true. 
Consider imaginings that arise in response to reading fiction. In reading a novel, for instance, 
we can initially imagine, as per allusions in the novel’s early chapters, that A is the villain; when 
we reach the final chapter, having followed all the novel’s twists and turns, we imagine that B, 
not A, is the villain. Likewise, we might first imagine that, as another work indicates, a certain 
building is going to explode, and then, in line with that work’s subsequent guidance, that the 
building is not going to explode. Such cases involve a shift from imagining a certain proposition 
to imagining a proposition overtly inconsistent with it. Hence, at least one of the imagined 
propositions—presumably the first—is i-false: the fact that we imagine it does not render it i-
true. Generalizing from the way imaginings function in such cases, it can be concluded that 
imaginings do not render their content i-true: imaginings are structured in such a way that their 
content can be either i-true or i-false. 
Several objections to this argument come to mind. First, it might be argued, as per the said 
distinction between fictional worlds and i-worlds, that although we imagine the fictional 
falsehood that A is the villain or that the building is going to explode, this proposition is 
nonetheless i-true. That is, even if certain propositions are false in the work’s fictional world, in 
the i-world—the world of the imaginative project that ensues in response to that work—these 
propositions are true. Those who take this position maintain that in general, regardless of what a 
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work of fiction assumes to be true, if we imagine a proposition in response to that work, the 
imagined proposition is ipso facto rendered true in the i-world of our project. 
This objection is problematic. One problem pertains to what the imaginer would report if 
asked about her imaginative project. Presumably, she will say that in imagining that A was the 
villain, she imagined an i-falsehood: she will describe the i-world of her imaginative project as 
being more or less the same as the work’s fictional world. For it seems that when we engage with 
fiction, our imaginative activity complies with the work’s mandate, and specifically, sets down 
that the propositions assumed by the work to be true (i.e., the fictional truths) are also i-truths. Of 
course, we do not always know, in reading the work, whether what we are imagining is 
fictionally true or false, and we do not immediately deem specific propositions to be i-true. 
Rather, we imagine what the work recounts, and are aware that what we are imagining is either i-
true or i-false. We ‘direct’ our imaginings at a certain i-world, without setting down that the 
propositions we imagine are i-true. Our awareness that the propositions we imagine are 
putatively assessed for i-truth indicates, I contend, that they are not rendered i-true solely by 
virtue of being imagined. 
Moreover, if imaginings rendered their content i-true, then shifting between imaginings with 
incompatible content would entail shifting from one i-world to another, or to put it differently, 
‘revising’ the pertinent i-world.2 Granted, revision of an i-world sometimes occurs. Interpreting a 
 
2 A similar objection might claim that while a shift between incompatible imaginings does not 
entail a shift between i-worlds, it entails that the i-world in question is inconsistent. My 
arguments refute this objection as well. That is, even if projects in which the i-world is 
inconsistent (e.g., Gendler’s ‘Tower of Goldbach’) are possible, in such projects, the imaginer’s 
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work incorrectly, for instance, we might initially assume that the unfolding events occur in 
London England, but upon interpreting the work correctly, realize that the events are described 
as occurring in London Ontario; we respond by revising the i-world accordingly. Such revisions, 
however, do not reflect the shifts from one imagining to another that are exemplified by the 
villain and soon-to-explode building cases. Examining our reactions to such shifts clarifies this 
point. As explained in the Introduction, belief-like imaginings are often accompanied by 
emotional, cognitive, and conative reactions that resemble our reactions to the corresponding 
beliefs. For instance, when we shift from imagining that A is the villain to imagining that B is the 
villain, we may have discovery- and surprise-like feelings, we may ‘regret’ that A was unjustly 
accused, be ‘relieved’ that he is no longer under suspicion, have ‘empathy’ for A’s family, etc. 
Similarly, upon shifting to imagining that the building is not going to explode, we feel ‘relieved,’ 
‘happy’ that it was a false alarm, etc. 
Such reactions would not arise if the said shifts from one imagining to another entailed 
shifting from one i-world to another. For what could be ‘surprising’ about imagining that A 
remains the villain in the i-world set down initially, whereas B is the villain in a different i-
world? And why do we feel ‘regret’ about A’s having been unjustly accused, if it remains the 
 
reactions to the shift in her imaginings (and so too, the way in which her imaginings unfold, her 
retrospective accounts of the project, etc.) do not mesh with the claim that the incompatible 
propositions she imagines are all true in the same i-world. For the putative response to imagining 
an inconsistent i-world would be a sense of bewilderment or incomprehension, whereas the 
reactions that typically ensue are not bafflement and incomprehension, but rather ‘sorrow,’ 
‘regret,’ ‘relief,’ etc. 
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case that A is the villain in the initially-posited i-world? In short, if our imaginings pertain to two 
different i-worlds, one in which A is the villain, and another in which B is the villain, our 
emotional, conative, and cognitive reactions are inexplicable. Similarly, upon shifting to 
imagining that in another i-world, the building isn’t going to explode, why would we feel 
‘relieved’? After all, it is still true in the initially-posited i-world that the building is going to 
explode. Our reactions to such shifts only make sense if these shifts are ‘intra-world’ shifts, i.e., 
if our imaginings are directed at the same i-world. In other words, such shifts are shifts from 
imagining falsehoods to imagining truths (or vice versa) in a specific i-world, as is the case when 
we shift between beliefs about real-world events. 
The manner in which our imaginings unfold also attests that in each of the cases in question, 
our imaginings are directed at a single i-world, and the said shifts are shifts from imagining a 
falsehood to imagining a truth in that i-world. In reading, and thereupon imagining, say, that A 
was abroad when the crimes ascribed to A were perpetrated, we are led to imagine that A is not 
the villain. That is, we understand that, for the inference that A is the villain to be valid, it cannot 
be true, in the specific i-world in question, that A was abroad when the crimes occurred. Upon 
being informed that A was abroad when the crimes occurred, we conclude that A is not the 
villain, and our imaginings shift accordingly. Our learning, and thereupon imagining, that A is 
not the villain, presupposes that the relevant propositions are assessed for truth in the same i-
world. The same reasoning applies to the case of the building, and to similar shifts from 
imagining one proposition to imagining an overtly-inconsistent proposition: the manner in which 
our imaginings unfold presupposes that the incompatible propositions are assessed for truth in 
the same i-world. 
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Imaginings with i-false content arise not only in response to works of fiction, but also in 
other contexts. Consider the well-known example devised by Walton (1990: 37): Eric and 
Gregory play a game of make-believe in which they take tree-stumps to be bears. Playing this 
game, they engage in an imaginative project in which some i-truths are determined by the 
‘stumps-are-bears’ rule. These i-truths have the form ‘there is a bear at such-and-such a spot,’ the 
spots in question being spots where there is a real-world tree-stump. As Walton presents the 
scenario, Eric and Gregory falsely believe that there is a tree-stump at a certain spot, and imagine 
that there is a bear at that spot. That is, they imagine an i-falsehood. Indeed, when they approach 
the spot and discover that there’s no stump there, they realize that they imagined an i-falsehood; 
they proceed to imagine the i-truth that there isn’t a bear at that spot, and respond to the shift by 
feeling ‘relieved.’ 
To explain this case, we must grant that belief-like imaginings do not render their content i-
true. Of course, upon discovering that there is no stump at the said spot, Eric and Gregory could 
decide to revise their game’s i-world, and make the proposition that there is a bear at that spot i-
true. Were they to do so, their reactions would be different: no relief-like feeling would arise, 
and they might attempt to ‘fight’ the bear, escape, or whisper to avoid ‘waking’ the bear. The 
important point is that they can stick to the stumps-are-bears rule, direct all their imaginings at a 
single i-world, and recognize that they imagined an i-falsehood. 
A different objection might concede that occasionally, belief-like imaginings do not render 
their content i-true, but argue that the cases I have adduced are too unusual to warrant the 
generalization that belief-like imaginings never render their content i-true. I maintain, however, 
that generalizing from the adduced cases to the conclusion that imaginings do not render their 
content i-true is not problematic. Though I believe that cases akin to those I have adduced are 
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commonplace, even were they rare (as the objection assumes), they would merit being taken into 
consideration in theorizing about imagination. These cases can play a role comparable to that 
played by the case of hallucination in theorizing about perception, or the possibility of brains in a 
vat in theorizing about mental content. Despite being far from common, to say the least, the 
hallucination and brains-in-a-vat examples play a key role in defending seminal theories about 
perceptual experience / mental content. 
The question, in short, is whether belief-like imagining in itself renders its content i-true. The 
foregoing arguments offer a cogent rationale for the thesis that it does not, since imaginings can, 
and often do, have i-false content. In addition to these arguments, the overall similarity between 
belief-like imaginings and beliefs provides a meta-theoretical motivation for this thesis. We often 
believe propositions to be true, and ordinarily, many of our beliefs are true. But since we 
sometimes have false beliefs, belief in and of itself cannot render its content true. Similarly, we 
imagine propositions to be true in the pertinent i-world, and ordinarily, many of our imaginings 
have i-true content. Yet as the foregoing arguments showed, since we sometimes imagine i-
falsehoods, the attitude of belief-like imagining cannot, in and of itself, render its content i-true. 
A variant of this objection might claim that the foregoing arguments only show that 
imaginings do not render their content i-true in the specific type of cases I have adduced, namely, 
cases where an ‘external’ source stipulates i-truths (e.g., what a fictional work assumes to be 
true, a game’s rules, etc.). However, in cases where there is no such external criterion—so it 
might be argued—imaginings may indeed render their content i-true, or at any rate, it has not 
been shown that they don’t. This objection will be addressed in the next section. 
 
2. Extending the Argument 
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2.1 Spontaneous Imaginative Projects 
 
The imaginative projects discussed in section 1 arise in response to directives. In such 
‘mandated’ projects, we acquire beliefs regarding how the imaginative project should unfold, 
then engage with the project accordingly. The examples we examined show that engaging in 
such projects involves being directed to imagine various propositions, and in addition, being 
directed to take certain propositions to be i-true. Imaginative projects can also be guided, not by 
instructions, but by the imaginer’s own intentions: we sometimes plan to imagine certain 
propositions. In such cases too, to the extent that i-truths are determined, they seem to be 
determined by virtue of our intention to imagine that which is i-true, not by our imaginings 
themselves. Indeed, just as we can intend to imagine i-truths, we can also intend to imagine i-
falsehoods. If, e.g., we want to imagine certain scenarios from the perspective of someone who 
has been fooled into believing that these scenarios are ‘facts of the i-world,’ we stipulate that 
certain propositions are i-false, and imagine them. 
I will call imaginative projects (or parts thereof) and imaginings that ensue in response to 
instructions, or are intended, ‘guided imaginative projects’ and ‘guided imaginings’ respectively. 
Thus far I have shown that guided imaginings do not render their content i-true. The question is 
now whether unguided, i.e., spontaneous, belief-like imaginings render their content i-true. 
For one thing, to claim that unguided imaginings, in contrast to guided imaginings, render 
their content i-true, seems problematic. Given that spontaneous and guided imaginings are 
attitudes of the very same type, and differ only with respect to whether they arise deliberately or 
not, how can unguided imaginings, simply because they arise extemporaneously, render their 
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content i-true? The burden of proof seems to fall on those who distinguish, apropos the 
determination of i-truths, between guided and unguided imaginings. 
Moreover, the same arguments that I raised against the claim that guided imaginings render 
their content i-true also apply to unguided imaginings. Consider unguided projects that involve 
shifts from imagining a proposition to imagining a contrary proposition. You might find yourself 
imagining, say, that a certain building is going to explode, that a search turns up no explosives, 
and hence (so you proceed to imagine) that it isn’t going to explode. You might likewise find 
yourself imagining that there’s a gold nugget in a certain river, and then that the sun sets, 
revealing that the shiny object is not gold, but a pebble illuminated by the sun. In such unguided 
projects, it is utterly implausible that all the imagined propositions are i-true, and that in shifting 
from imagining one proposition to imagining the contrary proposition, you also shifted from 
implicitly invoking one i-world to implicitly invoking another. For were you to shift from 
invoking one world to invoking another, your cognitive, conative, and emotional reactions would 
be different. If, e.g., in one i-world the building’s explosion is still imminent, but in another i-
world it was never imminent, you would not feel ‘relief’; if the shiny object is indeed a gold 
nugget in the first i-world, you would not feel, e.g., ‘surprised’ or ‘disappointed’ that it is a 
pebble in the other i-world. We must therefore conclude that, in these unguided projects, one’s 
imaginings pertain to the same i-world throughout. 
Furthermore, the unfolding of these unguided projects only makes sense if the imaginings 
are directed at the same i-world. After imagining that a certain building is going to explode, or 
that there’s a gold nugget in the river, imagining that a sweep of the building uncovers no 
explosives, or that the sun is setting and its illumination of the river has changed, would hardly 
induce you to imagine that in a different i-world the building isn’t going to explode, or that in a 
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different i-world the shiny object isn’t gold. Rather, they would induce you to imagine that, in 
one and the same i-world—the i-world at which your first imaginings were directed—the 
building isn’t, in fact, going to explode, or that the shiny object isn’t gold. Realizing that it is 
highly unlikely to be the case that no explosives are found in the building but it is about to 
explode, you change your imaginings accordingly. Likewise, realizing that, with the changed 
illumination, the object no longer resembles a gold nugget, you imagine that it isn’t a gold 
nugget as you first imagined it to be. In general, the fact that your imaginings are directed at a 
single i-world throughout—i.e., the propositions you imagine are assessed for truth in the same i-
world—makes it possible to account for the manner in which such shifts occur. 
Lastly, if asked about the unfolding of an unguided project of the sort we are discussing, the 
imaginer is likely to be completely baffled by the suggestion that her imaginings were directed at 
‘two different i-worlds.’ The fact that, in unguided projects, the imaginer lacks real-time 
awareness of how her project unfolds, and can describe it only upon retrospective reflection, 
ensues because such projects unfold without the mediation of beliefs or intentions about how 
they should unfold. I obviously do not deny that we can err in reporting on our imaginative 
activities. As Schwitzgebel (2011) famously demonstrated, discerning our own mental activity is 
problematic in general, not only vis-à-vis imagining. But there seems to be no reason to say that 
an imaginer must be mistaken in reporting that all her imaginings pertained to the same i-world. 
In short, since it is possible to suddenly find oneself imagining propositions that are not i-
true, it follows that having spontaneous imaginings—like having guided imaginings—does not 
entail that the content of those imaginings is i-true. Indeed, the attitude of belief-like imagining 
in general is characterized by this lack of any power to render its content i-true. In imagining, we 
are aware that the imagined proposition is assessable for truth in the project’s i-world, and not 
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necessarily i-true, just as in believing a proposition, we are aware that the believed proposition is 
assessable for truth (i.e., in the real world), and not necessarily true. Indeed, if we invoke only a 
project’s imaginings, we cannot infer from them alone which propositions are i-true, which are i-
false, and which are indeterminate. The mere fact that a proposition is imagined says nothing 
about whether it is i-true or not. 
Since i-truths are not determined by imagining alone, to discover which i-truths have been 
set down in a spontaneous project we must consider a different mental act or state. This issue is 
discussed in the next section. 
 
2.2 Determination of Imaginary Truths 
 
To the extent that an imaginative project encompasses specific i-truths, the determination of 
those i-truths is not identical to belief-like imagining, but takes place in addition to belief-like 
imagining. That is, to the extent that an imaginative project involves specific i-truths, since 
imagining a proposition to be i-true, in itself, does not render that proposition i-true, there must 
be an additional mental act or state that is part of that project, part of the overall mental activity 
we engage in when we imagine—an act or state whose role is to posit propositions to be i-true. 
Of course, this mental act or state can also be called ‘imagining’; indeed, it can hardly be denied 
that the term ‘imagining’ is used to denote different kinds of mental states in different contexts.3 
 
3 Specifically, when we say, e.g., ‘imagine a world in which p is true,’ we refer not, or not only, 
to belief-like imagining, but also to positing an i-world in which p is true. In this vein, García‐
Carpintero (2019: section 3), e.g., distinguishes between “ancillary imaginings” and “constitutive 
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But due to its functional role, the mental act or state of determining i-truths should be 
distinguished from belief-like imagining, as per the foregoing arguments. To distinguish this act 
or state from belief-like imagining, I will refer to it simply as the ‘determination of i-truths’ (the 
‘positing of i-truths,’ the ‘setting down of i-truths,’ etc.). 
In guided imaginative projects, i-truths are determined by the imaginer’s compliance with 
the relevant instructions or intentions. There are various ways to ascertain which propositions are 
mandated (e.g., by a work of fiction) to be i-true (see, e.g., Walton 1990: chapter 4; Currie 1990: 
chapter 2; Davies 2007: chapter 4), various ways to follow rules governing the stipulation of i-
truths, various ways to figure out which propositions we must posit to be i-true in order to learn 
from imagining (see, e.g., Kind 2018), etc. I do not discuss these ways here. However we 
recognize the propositions that are mandated to be i-true in our guided projects, we determine 
them to be i-true, as part of our imaginative project, upon grasping that mandate. 
Obviously, in unguided projects, the determination of i-truths is not a response to any 
mandate or intention. This issue has been overlooked in the literature, apart from Walton (1990; 
2015: chapter 2). Walton (1990: 44-5) argues that spontaneously imagining a proposition makes 
that proposition i-true (or as Walton puts it, fictionally true) by “establishing a prescription” (45) 
to imagine it. This claim of Walton follows from his definition of “fictionality” or “fictional 
truths” (1990: subsection 1.5). Walton argues that a proposition is fictionally true if and only if it 
is “to be imagined” (1990: 39). And since spontaneous imaginings do not arise in response to 
 
imagining”; this distinction seems to correspond to my own, though García‐Carpintero’s focus, 
unlike mine, is not belief-like imagining, and his theory applies only to imagining in the context 
of engaging with fiction. 
17 
any external mandate, Walton maintains that the state of imagining itself establishes the 
prescription that its content is to be imagined, and thus it renders the imagined proposition 
fictionally true (or, on the current definition, i-true). 
This explanation, however, raises several problems, some of which were pointed out by 
Walton himself, when he acknowledged that his initial “reductive account” (2015: 17), namely 
that a proposition is fictionally true just in case there is a prescription to the effect that it is to be 
imagined, was unsatisfactory (2015: chapter 2). In my opinion, the main problem with Walton’s 
account is that, as I showed, we do not always imagine i-truths. Contra Walton (1990), 
imaginings, in themselves, do not render their content i-true, and cannot be used to define i-truths 
(see also Chasid 2020: sections 3 and 5). 
Walton (2015: 28) suggests a different explanation, which is not committed to his initial 
reductive account of how fictional truths are determined: in spontaneous imaginative projects, 
the determining of i-truths is a matter of a decision on the part of the imaginer. But this proposal 
is also problematic. If Walton means that the decision is made in reflecting on the project 
retrospectively, this claim is incorrect. For to the extent that an imaginative project involves i-
truths, we are not free to decide, post-project, which i-truths it involved, given that the project 
has ended. Rather, we can discover these i-truths by retrospective reflection, just as we discover 
which propositions were imagined in the project, how it unfolded, etc. And if Walton means that 
the decision is made during the imaginative project, his claim is inconsistent with the fact that 
the overall manner in which the project arises is spontaneous, i.e., not deliberately scripted. 
Of course, since Walton mentions this claim only briefly, it is possible that he is not using 
the term ‘decide’ in the strict philosophical sense that implies agency or deliberate action. That 
is, Walton might be using ‘decide’ to refer to the fact that in spontaneous projects, we simply 
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determine i-truths—albeit non-deliberately (indeed, much as we imagine propositions non-
deliberately). On this interpretation of Walton’s claim, i.e., that in spontaneous imaginative 
projects, the determining of i-truths is a matter of a non-deliberate decision on the part of the 
imaginer, the following explanation can be seen as an explication of his claim. 
On this explanation (henceforth: explanation A), in unguided projects, just as we imagine 
certain propositions spontaneously, so we establish the relevant i-world spontaneously. That is, 
the act of determining i-truths, being part of an extemporaneous mental activity, namely, the 
imaginative project in question, is carried out extemporaneously. The idea is that, if an 
imaginative project can unfold unintentionally vis-à-vis the imaginings it encompasses, it can 
also unfold unintentionally vis-à-vis the determination of i-truths. For instance, in spontaneously 
imagining that there is a gold nugget on the riverbed, and then that the changed illumination—
the setting sun—reveals that the previously-shiny object is just a pebble, we also (i.e., in addition 
to imagining) extemporaneously establish an i-world in which it is true that the object is not 
gold, but a pebble. 
Explanation A does not distinguish between unguided projects and guided projects vis-à-vis 
the extent to which they involve specific i-truths. With respect to the determination of i-truths, 
the only difference between unguided and guided projects pertains to the spontaneity of the state 
or act of determination. Of course, since unguided projects do not arise in response to directives, 
discovering the i-truths they involve may not be easy. Again, although we are susceptible to 
being confused about our own stream of experience (Schwitzgebel 2011), it does not follow that 
we always err. Despite the fact that unguided projects arise without the mediation of beliefs as to 
how they should evolve, the imaginer can accurately report, upon retrospective reflection, on 
whether what she imagined was also posited to be i-true—just as she can accurately report that 
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she imagined certain propositions, reacted to her imaginings in such-and-such a way, etc. In the 
gold nugget case, for instance, the imaginer is likely to report that the proposition she first 
imagined—i.e., that there was a gold nugget in the river—was determined, probably at the 
second stage of the project, to be i-false. 
However, explanation A seems problematic in a certain respect. Whatever the extent to 
which we are susceptible to error in describing our spontaneous projects, the access we have to 
our imaginings, our reactions to those imaginings, and other mental elements of such imaginative 
projects is significantly more straightforward than the access we have to the (alleged) act or state 
of determining i-truths. The difficulty of pinpointing this act or state in spontaneous projects, 
where it does not ensue in response to intentions, rules, etc., invites the suspicion that in these 
projects, it simply does not exist. Consider the ‘gold nugget’ project. It does not seem difficult to 
pinpoint the imaginings that this project involved, the shift from imagining a gold nugget to 
imagining a pebble, our reaction to this shift, etc.; discerning these elements of the project is 
quite straightforward. By contrast, discerning the act of determining i-truths, and ascertaining the 
stage at which it was made, is far from straightforward. In trying to discover whether a specific 
proposition was i-true, we generally do not directly recall the act of making a determination to 
that effect; rather, we recall how our imaginings evolved, and from this recollection try to infer 
which i-truths were spontaneously posited. For instance, we recall that, after imagining the gold 
nugget, we imagined that the changed illumination revealed that the object was only a pebble; 
relying on the way our imaginings evolved, we reason that the later imaginings were ‘correct,’ 
not the initial ones. We likewise conclude that the act or acts of determining these i-truths took 
place, more or less, when we engaged with the later, ‘revised’ imaginings. 
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But this reasoning is flawed. For one thing, why must we conclude that, since there was a 
shift from imagining one proposition to imagining a contrary one, the later imagining (i.e., that 
the change in illumination revealed that the object was only a pebble) was the ‘correct’ one? In 
general, there is no reason to assume, without further qualification, that the later imagining, or 
the imagining that ‘revises’ previous imaginings (within the project), has i-true content. 
Likewise, there is no reason to assume that the determination of i-truths occurs, roughly, when 
the initial imagining is ‘revised.’ Given that imaginings do not render their content i-true, the fact 
that while imagining, we experienced the ‘revelation’ that the object on the riverbed was only a 
pebble says nothing about whether this content was also determined to be i-true. Since 
spontaneous projects are not framed by intentions—and specifically, not by the intention to 
imagine the i-truth—the way in which imaginings evolve in such a project says little, if anything 
about which i-truths (if any) were determined. With respect to the act of determining specific i-
truths, spontaneous imaginings evolve in a contingent manner. 
Note also that, since spontaneous projects also end spontaneously, we can likewise speculate 
about what would happen were our project to (spontaneously) continue and proceed to another 
shift, namely, a shift to imagining that the object on the riverbed is a gold nugget after all. If, to 
discover which i-truths were posited, we rely on how our imaginings have (spontaneously) 
evolved, this speculation about an additional, i.e., a second, shift might undermine our initial 
judgment that it was i-true that the object was a pebble. It might, perhaps, be claimed that such 
an ‘extended’ project would differ from our original project with regard to the i-truths the 
projects comprise. But there is no reason to say that they necessarily differ in this respect. 
Although the original (one-shift) and the conjectured (two-shift) projects comprise different 
imaginings, that need not mean that they comprise different i-truths. Such a speculation about an 
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extended project can easily undermine our initial judgment about which i-truths our spontaneous 
project involved.4 
Moreover, even if we can correctly conclude, by some indirect means, that our project 
encompassed certain i-truths, discovering at which stage of the project these i-truths were 
determined is far from straightforward. In the gold-nugget project, e.g., it might at first seem that 
if it is i-true that the object is only a pebble, this i-truth was determined, roughly speaking, when 
we shifted from imagining that it was gold to imagining that it was a pebble. Suppose, however, 
that we realize that our project echoed a recent real-world experience, say, a recent trip to a gold-
panning site in Colorado, during which we observed that pebbles illuminated by the sun can be 
readily mistaken for gold nuggets. Recalling this experience might undermine our judgment 
about when the i-truth that the object was just a pebble was determined. For if the project was 
(spontaneously) structured to reflect our real-world experience, the i-truth that the object on the 
riverbed was a pebble seems to have been determined right at the outset of the project. 
I adduce these complications that arise in trying to pin down what a given project’s i-truths 
are, and when they are set down, not, or not only, to show that this undertaking is susceptible to 
error. In fact, if explanation A is correct, it can explain this susceptibility. In general, absent 
evidence to the contrary, imaginers tend to think that what they imagine at a certain stage is i-
true. Though I will not develop this argument here, it seems that since spontaneous projects are 
not constrained by explicit criteria for i-truth (intentions, instructions, rules, etc.), having 
 
4 In principle, i-truths can be determined even after a project is paused and then continues. This 
scenario can occur even in ‘paused’ guided projects, e.g., projects that arise in response to “serial 
fictions” such as the Star Wars films; see Walters’s analysis in Walters (2017). 
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imagined a proposition to be true can easily induce the imaginer, in reflecting on her project, to 
conclude that this proposition was also determined to be i-true. Compare imaginings to beliefs: 
much as we do not distinguish, from the first-person perspective, between true propositions and 
propositions we believe to be true (although we know they may, and sometimes do, differ), we 
do not generally distinguish, at any given stage of an imaginative project, between i-truths and 
propositions we imagine to be true. 
This argument merits a separate discussion, but if it is sound, explanation A can invoke it in 
explaining the difficulty we encounter in seeking to discern the act of determining i-truths. 
However, this difficulty may also indicate that the attempt to pinpoint such determinations is 
futile, since there may not be any such determinations. That is, explaining the difficulty in 
ascertaining what a spontaneous imaginative project’s i-truths are presupposes that such projects 
involve determinations of i-truths. But precisely because it is difficult to discern such 
determinations, we might well conclude that such (alleged) acts are not part of spontaneous 
projects. Spontaneous projects, it might be suggested, can be fully accounted for without 
assuming that they involve determinations of specific i-truths. The difficulty of discerning acts of 
determining i-truths—a difficulty that does not arise with respect to other elements of 
spontaneous imaginative projects (i.e., imaginings, our reactions to them, etc.)—is sufficient 
motivation to consider an alternative explanation. 
 
2.3 No Imaginary Truths? 
 
On a different explanation (henceforth: explanation B), there is a radical difference between 
guided and unguided projects: whereas in guided projects we determine specific i-truths by 
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complying with external criteria (a fictional work’s assumptions, rules, etc.), or in line with 
intentions, in unguided projects we do not determine any specific i-truths. This does not mean 
that spontaneous imaginings are not directed at an i-world, only that the i-world is indeterminate. 
In the ‘soon-to-explode building’ and ‘gold nugget’ examples, we shift from imagining one 
proposition to imagining an incompatible proposition, while being aware that our imaginings are 
putatively assessed for truth in the same i-world. The crucial point is that, given the absence of 
guidance as to what is true, this i-world is indeterminate: we imagine certain propositions to be 
true, but whether these propositions are true in the i-world is undetermined. 
Explanation B is consistent with the thesis defended in section 1, namely, that belief-like 
imaginings do not render their content i-true. For this thesis does not entail that specific i-truths 
must obtain, but argues that if i-truths obtain, they are not determined by our belief-like 
imaginings. Explanation B is also compatible with the arguments adduced in section 1. The 
unfolding of spontaneous projects does not require the determination of specific i-truths, it 
requires only awareness that the imagined content is putatively assessed for truth in the project’s 
i-world. In particular, directing our imaginings at that i-world suffices to account for our 
emotional, cognitive, and conative reactions to our imaginings. Again, compare imaginings to 
beliefs. To account for feelings of discovery, surprise, relief, etc., as well as desires and other 
conative states, we need only invoke the subject’s beliefs, not whether they are true or false. 
Whatever the real world is like, our feelings, desires, etc., depend only on what we believe it to 
be like. Similarly, to explain our imaginative mental activity, all we need assume is that we 
imagine certain propositions to be true, not that specific propositions are true in our project’s i-
world. In the gold nugget project, for instance, it is not determined whether the shiny object is a 
nugget or a pebble. The imaginer takes the imagined propositions to be putatively assessed for 
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truth in that i-world, and her reactions arise—so explanation B contends—only because she 
shifts from imagining one proposition to imagining another. 
On explanation B, if the imaginer reports that specific i-truths obtained in her project—e.g., 
that it was i-true that the shiny object was not gold—she must be mistaken. This generalization 
seems problematic, but in light of the aforementioned tendency to misdescribe our spontaneous 
mental activities, it can be deemed a relatively minor problem. Given B’s theoretical parsimony, 
the price that explanation B exacts in this respect is tolerable. Note further that on explanation B, 
the determination of specific i-truths plays no intrinsic role in imaginative projects in general. 
That is, the ‘core’ imaginative mental activity—the mental activity common to guided and 
unguided projects—need not involve specific i-truths. The sole context in which specific i-truths 
are posited is that of guided projects, where specific ‘truths’ are stipulated so as to convey 
instructions about what is to be imagined (e.g., if p is presented as i-true by a work of fiction, the 
imaginer will typically respond by imagining that p). 
At first sight, explanation B, being more parsimonious than explanation A, might seem more 
theoretically appealing. However, in addition to its problematic implication that vis-à-vis 
unguided projects, an imaginer’s reports about specific i-truths must be mistaken, explanation B 
has another shortcoming. For specific i-truths do play a significant role in unguided imagining. 
In some cases, differences between spontaneous imaginative projects can best be accounted for 
by invoking differences between their respective i-truths. If spontaneous projects sometimes 
differ as to the i-truths set down in them, it follows that such projects indeed involve specific i-
truths. 
To see this more clearly, consider Mary, who finds herself imagining that she is interviewing 
Lady Gaga (henceforth LG), winner of the 2019 Academy Award for Best Actress (This 
25 
example is based on a similar example in Williams 1973: 29). Mary’s imagining can be part of 
two different imaginative projects. To establish the difference, suppose that, after Mary tells her 
spouse about her daydream, her spouse replies that, although LG was nominated, Olivia Colman 
(henceforth OC) won the award, not LG. 
At this stage, two different scenarios could unfold. On the first scenario, Mary reacts to her 
spouse’s comment with embarrassment, admitting that she had falsely believed that LG, not OC, 
had won, and hence had imagined that she was interviewing LG. That is, Mary admits that her 
daydream ‘went wrong’ (so to speak) in the sense that, had she known who the real winner was, 
her daydream would have been about that person: she would have imagined interviewing OC, 
not LG. 
On the second scenario, Mary dismisses her spouse’s comment, saying that she knows, or 
doesn’t care, that OC won. Her daydream, she claims, reflected the (non-actualized) possibility 
that LG won: she imagined that, regardless of the real-world winner, she was interviewing LG 
qua winner. 
The two projects differ in structure. Yet the difference is not between the imagined 
propositions, for in both projects, Mary imagines precisely the same proposition, namely, that 
she is interviewing LG, 2019 winner of Best Actress. Nor does the difference pertain to Mary’s 
intentions, since both projects arise spontaneously. Rather, each project sets down 
(spontaneously) as i-true a different proposition about the interviewee’s identity. In the first 
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project, the i-world winner is posited to be whoever the real-world winner is (i.e., OC)5; in the 
second project, the i-world winner is posited to be LG, regardless of the real-world winner. 
Mary’s ‘failure’ in the first project follows from a mismatch between what was fixed as true in 
the i-world regarding the putative object of Mary’s imagining, and what Mary actually imagined. 
In the second project, no such mismatch occurred, since Mary’s imagining accorded with what 
was set down as obtaining in the i-world: LG was posited as the putative object of Mary’s 
imagining, and Mary indeed imagined interviewing LG. 
The idea is that in addition to differing with respect to the imagined propositions, 
spontaneous imaginative projects can also differ in the extent to which their respective i-worlds 
are set down as being similar to the real world, i.e., differ as to which truths simpliciter are set 
down as the project’s i-truths. It follows that, contra explanation B, spontaneous projects can 
involve the determination of specific i-truths. 
Supporters of explanation B might seek to argue that, although the difference between 
Mary’s two projects is a difference in what her imaginings are structured as being about, this 
structural difference does not entail that different i-truths obtain in the two projects (and hence, 
does not entail that the projects set down specific i-truths). Perhaps imaginative projects could, 
B’s supporters might suggest, involve some sort of ad hoc mechanism for determining the extent 
to which a specific imagining is about real-world objects. In Mary’s first project, the mismatch is 
indeed between what Mary imagined and what her imagining was structured as being about. But 
 
5 Note that it is not the case that the interviewee in the first project was posited to be the person 
Mary believed to be the real-world winner. Were it the case, there would have been no ‘failure,’ 
since Mary indeed imagined the person she believed to be the real-world winner (i.e., LG). 
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the determination as to whether her imagining is supposed to be about the real-world winner or 
about LG is an ad hoc determination that does not involve any i-truths. Note that the crucial 
element of this hypothetical claim is not that imaginings with the same content can be about 
different real-world objects or events; rather, it is the assertion that the determination of what an 
imagining is ‘about’ does not depend on what the pertinent i-world is like. According to this 
hypothetical claim, although imaginings are ‘directed’ at the pertinent i-world (in the sense that 
their content is putatively assessed for truth in that world), what they are about can sometimes be 
‘detached’ from the i-world, and extemporaneously determined to be about a real-world object or 
event that is not part of the i-world. Thus, on this claim, the only difference between Mary’s two 
projects is that in the first project, her imagining is structured, ad hoc, such that it is about the 
real-world winner, whereas in the second, it is structured, ad hoc, such that it is about LG, 
though the i-worlds of the two projects are fully indeterminate.6 
 
6 Various versions of the claim that imaginings can be about real-world objects or events have 
been suggested. Interestingly, a version of this claim is put forward by Davies (2015; see also 
Friend 2000) regarding fictive utterances. Davies argues that authors of fictions can intend that 
readers imagine certain things about (what the author takes to be) a “real setting” (Davies 2015: 
44), in which case they are asked to believe something about that “real setting.” Yet as Davies 
presents his claim, the real setting is obviously part of what is “true in the story” (45) (Davies’s 
notion of “true in the story” overlaps the Waltonian notion of ‘true in the i-world’ that I invoke in 
this paper, a notion that is also applicable to spontaneous projects; see Introduction). By contrast, 
on the hypothetical claim in question, imaginings can, by some ad hoc mechanism, be 
imaginings of real settings, without those settings being part of the i-world. 
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I certainly grant that, in addition to imaginings, imaginative projects can involve other 
structural features. But it is implausible to invoke ad hoc features to explain a difference if a 
more obvious explanation is at hand. Without further qualification, when the i-world is set down 
as being the same as the real world in specified respects, specific i-truths must be set down, and 
this is where imaginative projects may ‘fail,’ so to speak, as happened in the case of Mary’s first 
project. Explanation B, in explaining the difference between Mary’s two projects by invoking an 
ad hoc mechanism that somehow establishes the structure of those projects without recourse to 
the notions of i-truth and i-falsehood, loses its purported advantage, namely, parsimony. 
We can therefore conclude that unguided projects sometimes involve specific i-truths: 
explanation B’s claim that in unguided projects no i-truths are determined is highly implausible. 
Of course, i-truths may not be set down in unguided projects as often as they are set down in 
guided projects. The extent to which unguided projects do involve i-truths can be ascertained, if 
not by relying on imaginers’ reports, by the strategy I have suggested, namely, showing that 
differences between imaginative projects can be best explained by taking them to be differences 
between specific i-truths. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Belief-like imaginings rarely arise unaccompanied. I have shown that, in addition to the mental 
states that accompany them (e.g., emotional and conative reactions, mental imagery, 
motivations), they are also often accompanied by the mental state or act of determining i-truths. 
This paper opened by asserting that imagining a proposition in a belief-like way does not 
render that proposition i-true. Showing that imaginative projects often involve i-truths, it argued 
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that in addition to imaginings, the determination of i-truth is part of such projects. Although this 
claim can be readily demonstrated with regard to guided imaginative projects—i.e., projects that 
are intended or arise in response to instructions—it is more difficult to see that spontaneous 
projects also involve the determination of i-truths, though the act of determining an i-truth is 
impromptu. 
Examining competing explanations regarding whether—and if so, how—specific i-truths are 
set down in spontaneous projects, I showed that comparing similar imaginative projects is an 
effective strategy for discovering whether such projects set down specific i-truths. Given the 
problematic nature of our access to our mental life (and, in particular, our imaginative 
excursions), this strategy may be more useful than relying on imaginers’ reports about which 
propositions, if any, were set down as i-true in their imaginative projects. 
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